Non-electoral Political Impact of Emigration (Author: Mark Mazureanu)

            In this post I will analyze where emigrants have a capacity to influence the political processes back home besides their electoral participation. The element of emigrant'selectoral participation is discussed in the following post.

            Migrants have multiple development effects on the left behind states, largely debated in media and in scholarly literature. Obviously the most debated is the topic of the economic impact of emigration. I consider that having a look at the political impact of emigration is probably more important since the state political structure is the foundation of a certain economic development. In this article I will analyze the political impact of emigrants and diaspora on their home societies. For this purpose I will revise a large body o literature that shows us both the positive and negative effects of emigration. I will not come with a conclusion for Moldova leaving this question open for the reader.

I will start this review from having a look on the theory of political socialization that describes the process of emigrant-led democratic diffusion through transfers of norms in forms of social and political remittances (Fargues, 2007; Beine et al., 2008; Spilimbergo, 2009; Kerr, 2008; Agrawal et al., 2011). Lauth and Pickel (2009) define diffusion in its broader sense as “a process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time” (p. 40). This process is voluntary and unintended. The assumption is that the novelty, when perceived as attractive, “is transferred from one country to another with a noticeable effect” (Rother, 2009, p. 250). Democratic diffusion, in this sense, takes place through various channels such as the media, networks, secondary socialization (i.e. education, work), and migration. Diffusion, in this context, is seen “as an exogenous factor for democratization, carrying opinions, values and expectations that can have an endogenous effect” (p. 251).

Political and social remittances, in this context, are observed as non-pecuniary forms of transfers that contribute to the process of democratization in their home societies (Levitt, 1998; Rother, 2009; Batista & Vicente, 2011; Garza & Hazan, 2003). Levitt (1998) defines social remittances as “ideas, behaviors, identities, and social capital that flow from receiving- to sending-country communities” (p. 927). They constitute all social and cultural resources that are brought by emigrants with them from the Global North to the Global South. By not having a direct political character, social remittances transform migrants into actors with significant leverage able to shape political and civic demands back home (Itzigsohn & Villacres, 2008). These alternative forms of remittances received by local communities in countries of origin from their emigrant fellows oftentimes contribute to the process of democratization. Emigrants thus become, as Thomas Faist calls them, “collective agents of change” that promote new “forms of governance, rights and responsibilities, and democracy” (2008, p. 26-27). So, the higher the number of emigrants residing abroad, the more social and political remittances they are able to send back home.

In the “emancipative theory of democracy” Inglehart and Welzel’s (2005) analyze how mass attitudes can influence the levels of democracy in a specific state. Though Welzel (2007) does not refer to the role of migrants per se in his further study, the scholar analyzes how an increase in pro-democratic attitudes within a country motivates mass actions that consequently prove people’s willingness to struggle for democratic transformations. This might indirectly speak about the diffusion of democratic ideas brought also by migrants from hosting societies and their positive effect on levels of democratization. Deriving from Welzel’s findings, we can infer that the higher is the number of those spreading democratic values, the stronger is the demand for democratization, and consequently the higher is a society’s chance to democratize. Portes (1999) also highlights the positive role of trans-migrants on the country of origin and civic culture. He studies how local civic associations can influence the power structure of places of origin and how returnees can help reshape local life. Portes claims, that transnational migrant activities have a democratizing effect on local communities.

Itzigsohn et al. (1999), and Guarnizo et al. (1999), conclude in the same volume that the emigrants’ driving force for democratic change and greater influence is determined by their preponderant intolerance towards local traditional elites, their lack of exposure to repressive and cooptive mechanisms used by these elites, and finally, increased economic capacity and freedom to organize abroad. While living abroad, migrants have the freedom “to denounce corruption and seek to improve their communities outside traditional political channels” (Portes, 1999, p. 474). Moreover, Portes concludes that “[t]he experience of living under a democratic system with an effective and autonomous judicial system socializes immigrants into a new political outlook and increases their expectation for change in their own countries” (p. 474). This political socialization process experienced abroad makes migrant communities and organizations challenge “old rules” and call for higher levels of democracy in their country of origin.

The literature also shows that the emigrants’ economic capacity conditions their political impact. In this sense, the power to demand political and social transformations is legitimized through the massive economic support offered by the emigrants. The established channels of financial help provided to their dependents and implementation of large societal projects through established networks of grassroots philanthropic actions empowers their voice and makes them influential actors in local politics (Fox, 2009). Consequently they manage to create a “migrant civil society”, which contributes to the construction of public spaces and representative social and civic organizations. In this regard, emigrants are perceived as having enough capacity and leverage to induce democratic transformations at home.

Though the aforementioned arguments seem plausible they also have some major lapses that need to be discussed. Since the so far conclusion might look too optimistic conclusions. First, not all emigrants are moving to mature and consolidated democracies. A large part of global emigration is conditioned not by the political but mainly by economic, financial (Rother, 2009), and security reasons. Emigrants fleeing the areas affected by natural disasters, military conflicts and economic distress are moving to other areas that provide better conditions than in their country of origin. Their choice in this case is dictated by two factors: the availability of migratory chain-networks, and the resources at their disposal necessary to emigrate. Since both of them are usually limited, emigrants use the lip-frog emigration practice meaning that they move just to the adjacent state where the political landscape is not significantly different from their home communities (MacDonald, J. & MacDonald L., 1964). Short-term migrants tend to move first of all to those areas where jobs with higher income are available. These states, however, are not necessarily democratic. For instance, the oil rich Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates countries started in the 1970s to invest in economic spheres other than oil. This change created numerous job opportunities for low-skilled construction and infrastructure workers that have been supplied from abroad. The same tendency was observed in the case of Singapore and Hong Kong by offering jobs for women coming from neighboring countries as housekeepers. And the most obvious case for us –Russia, a state that by far is not a democracy. The accessibility of relatively better-paid jobs did not socialize emigrants into democratic patterns in these cases (Rother, 2009). Moreover, Goodman and Hiskey (2008) argue that even if migrants move to a democracy they have little exposure to the host country’ democratic institutions. Consequently political remittances should be analyzed from a very equivoque perspective.

Violence and radical ideas are another version of undesirable social remittances that are transferred together with returning migrants. Kapur (2007) presents instances when Pakistani and Yemeni combatant migrants to Afghanistan brought upon return new radical and militarist ideas, which were very dangerous for their societies considering the already unstable political context in these states. Many of the illegal emigrants from Latin to North America are much more inclined to use weapons upon return. Kapur also, discusses the sizable effects of criminal networks of common in diverse diaspora groups. He shows that much of the international crimes reported by the United Nations, that ranges annually between $1–1.5 trillion earned from drug trafficking, arms trading, human trafficking are also constitutive parts of variations of social remittances. Consequently, this negative experience increases the level of violence and slows down the prospects for positive political transformations in the emigrant sending countries.

Rother (2009) also shows that the process of migration consolidates the existing political attitudes, the “degree and direction of such changes in attitudes are dependent on migrants' [previous] individual experience” with freedoms and restrictions, and a potential bias when selecting the country of destination (p. 256). In this context, the migration experience has equal chances to lead to a more critical position in regards to the homeland government, as well as to lead to lesser support for democratic standards.

Political diffusion of ideas driven by returning migrants also means the spread of any ideology not just the democratic one. It also includes the spread of autocratic or religious fundamentalist ideas. That is why political socialization could similarly bring positive as well as negative consequences. Mahmoud et al. (2010) investigation on the voting patterns of Moldovan emigrants in the Russian Federation and the European states in 2005 and 2009 elections serve as example. His results show a strong antidemocratic spillover effect from Russia. He shows that the majority of the Moldovans residing in Russia voted predominantly for the Communists’ Party (which is considered of lower democratic standards) while those residing in Europe voted predominantly for pro-European parties. He claims that the high rate of emigration to Russia increased the already high support for the communists’ party. This voting pattern was conditioned by the spillover effect of autocratic political values socialized by Moldovan emigrants in a non-democratic setting of residence.

Another salient example is Ruget and Usmanalieva’s (2011) qualitative research on political perception and behavior of Kyrgyz emigrants residing in Russian Federation. When asked to choose among a set of political priorities, the majority of respondents prioritized ‘stability’ over other issues. ‘Democracy’ was chosen only by one fourth of respondents, and another quarter declared themselves are not interested in political issues at all. Ruget & Usmanalieva (2011) conclude on the case of Kyrgyz emigrants that being exposed to well-functioning authoritarianism abroad, emigrants will support the same type of regime home.

Emigration can also negatively impact prospects of democratization at home through indirect means, such as brain drain. Brain drain reflects the potential economic and socio-political losses associated with emigration. According to the U.S. Census as cited in Rapoport (2002), 88 percent of immigrants to OECD countries had at least secondary school degrees. The flight of the most valuable citizens, in this sense, leads to the decrease of a nation’s capacity to create bright oppositions (Li and McHale, 2009; Hirschman, 1970). In this context, it is a commonly recognized fact that emigration from Mexico and Haiti to the U.S. has slowed down the political change in these countries. Hirschman (1970), claims that emigration is a form of political curse for democratizing societies because it allows those dissatisfied with their political institutions to leave their home country. Thus, by choosing to ‘exit’, emigrants abandon the domestic political struggle and subsequently weaken the domestic democratic opposition. Conversely, if emigrants choose to stay and express their “voice”, they choose to participate in the process of demanding political change. Comparable political analyses have been posted about the autocratic regimes in Cuba (Colomer, 2000; Hoffman, 2005), Belarus, Haiti (Ferguson, 2003) and Mexico (Hansen, 1988), where emigration was used as means to reduce domestic pressure.

The more recent wave of migration from the region, however, shows a different pattern. Morawska (2002) argues in this sense that “the relationship between westbound travels of a vast majority of migrants and democratization in their home countries has weakened” (p. 164). Migration, in this context, has helped to depress the resistance from below by serving as a “pressure valve” in the process of providing job opportunities abroad in the context of unpopular economic reforms at home. Remittances secured a certain level of income for the local population while making them apathetic to the decreasing quality of the provided public services. Also, the chance for the dissatisfied to leave can empower a non-conflicting slow democratic transition. Hirschman (1970) also states that the option for exiting allows the most radical demanders such as anarchists, socialists, and revolutionaries to vacate the dense political debate. By leaving the political sphere, they decrease the levels of social tensions in society, and allow gradual reforms to be carried out.

Moreover, brain drain does not necessarily decrease the political opposition capacity as presented by Hirschman (1970) argument on ‘exit voice’. On the contrary, the prospects of emigration increase the demand for education in the country of origin. This fact redefines the individual choices of utility of the knowledge by making people want to invest more in education. The perspective of emigration resupplies the local society with better-educated and more politically involved actors (Mountford, 1997; Beine et al., 2001). Spilimbergo (2009) also looks at the spillover effect of foreign education. He argues that foreign education acquired by the emigrants in countries with established democratic regimes have a positive effect on democratization in their home societies. Ostergaard-Nielsen (2001) also claims that emigration does not decrease by far emigrants’ political participation. The expressed ‘exit’ does not speak in favor of a weakened domestic civil society, as Hirschman (1970) claims, because the ‘exit’ already reflects the voice of the weak. Vice-versa, by finding fertile lands for political mobilization in hosting societies, emigrants intensify their transnational political activity (Fox, 2009). Portes (1999) notes that many Mexicans left exactly because they did not have a voice or because the authorities denied their expression of that voice. Consequently the enfranchisement of emigrants is always an act of supporting the opposition, as the emigrants will be very reluctant to vote for the power elites.  Looking through the perspective of political diffusion theory Mahmoud et al. (2003) notes that Hirschman’s exit voice theory could be valid for the ‘50s-‘60s when the decision to emigrate was signaling the total removal from the political context where the political pressure could be exercised. Whereas, the advance of modern communication and transportation networks offers now the possibility for the removed from the system emigrants to exercise a political power on the home society sometimes maybe even stronger than if the emigrant would stay home. Since the emigrant is exposed to new modern ideas that could be easily transferred by them back home.

From this review we see that besides migroEuro or migroRuble the emigratns have a strong capacity to influence both positively and negatively the political process in Moldova. The question is which of the pro or anti democratization pol proves stronger? In one of the next posts I will discuss the emigration political impact on Moldovan politics. 

No conclusion…

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